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cial banks. The banking industry has experienced a series of signiﬁcant
transformations in the last two or three decades. Among the most im-
portant of them is the change in the type of organizations that dominate the
landscape. Since the eighties, banks have increased the scope and scale of
their activities, and several banks have become very large institutions with a
presence in multiple regions of the country. After this long period of trans-
formations, now is a good time to stop and look back at the changes that have
occurred.
Reviewing these trends over the last thirty years may also help to put in
perspective the behavior of the banking system during the 2001 recession.
We have not had many recessions since the major transformations in banking
happened. Infact,theonlyotherrecessiontookplacein1991–1992andfound
thebankingsysteminthemiddleoftheresolutionofawidespreadcrisis. After
two years of slow recovery, this is an appropriate time to assess how the new
banking system behaved during the last recession. For such evaluation, it is
useful to have a long-run (thirty year) perspective on the direction of change
in the relevant variables. This perspective is the focus of the present article.
This study concentrates only on commercial banks, most of which are
part of a larger company, a bank holding company. Sometimes, more than
one commercial bank belongs to the same bank holding company. These
banks are called sister banks. In general, sister banks tend to be managed as
different branches of a single bank rather than as independent banks. In fact,
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until the mid-1980s, the creation of sister banks was partly a response to strict
regulations on branching. In this sense, looking at sister banks as different
banks can be somewhat misleading, even from the perspective of regulators,
since sister banks are subject to cross-guarantee provisions by which one
bank can be liable for its sister bank’s losses. However, only 30 percent
of U.S. banks belong to multi-bank holding companies. Furthermore, the
parent organization is subject to limited liability protection rules with respect
to the losses in the bank. These rules make the ﬁnancial situation of the
individual banks still important for regulatory purposes, to the extent that the
losses associated with a bank’s failure may still be transferred to the insurance
fund, even when the bank holding company does not go bankrupt. For these
reasons, and since the data on commercial banks is readily available, it seems
appropriate to focus on the population of commercial banks to identify the
relevant major trends in the industry.
When possible, I will discuss the evolution of the industry from 1970 to
the present. Boyd and Gertler (1993) reviewed the trends in U.S. commercial
bankingsincetheﬁfties. Myanalysiscomplementstheirs, asIextendthedata
period to include the last ten years (see also Carlson and Perli 2002). In some
cases,dataavailabilityallowsmetogobackonlyto1984whentheprocedures
used by banks to report information to the regulators (The Call Reports) were
thoroughly revised.
Thearticleisorganizedasfollows. InSection1,Iprovideaquickoverview
of the changes in the structure of the industry. In Section 2, I study the major
trends in the balance sheet of all commercial banks, taken as a group. When
informative, I divide the banks into four different groups, according to their
size measured by total assets. In Section 3, I perform a similar analysis of the
evolution of the income statement of banks. Finally, I reserve Section 4 for
some conclusions.
1. THE INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
For the period under study, one of the main changes in the structure of the
banking industry has been a movement toward consolidation. An entire lit-




more integrated at the national level. The tendency to run national operations
(as opposed to regional) is quite evident in the retail sector, for example. The
consequences of this trend to banking come directly and indirectly. The direct
effect originates in the fact that a large portion of the activities of banks, such
as the provision of checking accounts and other payment instruments, is retail
in nature and hence subject to the same forces to become national. MoreH. M. Ennis: Commercial Banking 43
Figure 1 The Number of Commercial Banks









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Annual Data for FDIC-Insured Commer-
cial Banks: Tables CB01, CB02, CB03).
indirectly, it is also the case that some of the major customers of banks are
retailers, which, having acquired national presence, are now more likely to
beneﬁt from a relationship with a nationwide bank. The natural response has
then been for banks to move toward consolidation.
At the beginning of the eighties, the number of commercial banks was
more than 14,000, but by 2002, this number was less than 8,000 (see Panel
A of Figure 1). It is striking to see the sharp change in 1985 to a signiﬁcant
downward trend in the number of commercial banks. Several factors are
associated with this change. Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the number
of mergers increased during the eighties and nineties. It should be noticed,
however, that this time series is quite volatile. The number of new charters44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
alsodecreasedduringtheeighties, butthecreationofnewbankswentbackup
to historical levels during the second half of the nineties. Finally, the number
of bank failures increased signiﬁcantly during the second half of the eighties
but again went back to normal levels (or even lower) after 1994.1
The late eighties and early nineties were a period of crisis in the commer-
cial banking industry, clearly reﬂected by the increase in the number of bank
failures. However, the time series for the number of commercial banks does
not seem to reﬂect this abnormal period: the number of banks is decreasing
at an almost constant rate since 1985 (see PanelA of Figure 1). One possible
interpretation for this lack of response in the number of banks during the cri-
sis is that the trend in this variable is dictated by changes in long-run factors
like technological progress (see Broaddus [1998] for a similar argument). In
this sense, we can think that at each point in time there is a target number
of banks in the economy which is determined by the technology of produc-
tion, the factors inﬂuencing demand, and, of course, government regulations.
Under this interpretation, the target number of banks has been subject to a
relatively constant decreasing trend that started in the mid-eighties, and the
crisis that occurred during the late eighties and early nineties was an abrupt
change affecting only who were the participants in the industry (but not how
many participants the industry should have). In other words, during the crisis
some banks failed and some new banks were created, but this process had no
signiﬁcant effect on the underlying speed of consolidation.
In spite of the decreasing trend in the number of banks, it is interesting to
notethatthenumberofbrancheshasactuallybeenincreasing(andataboutthe
historic trend) during this consolidation period (see Panel C in Figure 1). One
of the fears commonly associated with a move toward consolidation is that
competition may be reduced as fewer and bigger banks dominate the market.
However, the increase in the number of branches may be an indication that
the level of competition in regional markets has not signiﬁcantly decreased.2
PanelDinFigure1showsthedecliningtrendinthenumberofunitbanks.
In the seventies, unit banks were being replaced by institutions with branches.
After the mid-eighties, both the number of unit banks and the number of insti-
tutions with branches trended downward. At ﬁrst, consolidation was mostly
reducing the number of small unit banks, but by the early nineties the strong
movetoconsolidationalsoreachedtheintermediateandlarge-sizebankswith
branches (hence the decrease in their number). One important caveat with
1 The number of banking organizations, that is, the number of banks adjusted to treat all
banks within the same holding company as a single bank, decreased steadily from more than
12,000 in 1980 to less than 6,000 in 1998. See Rhoades (2000), which also provides an excellent
review of the patterns on merger activity during the period.
2 Berger and Mester (2003) calculate the average Herﬁndahl index of concentration in local
deposit markets and conclude that the increase in market concentration from 1984 to 1997 has
been very moderate.H. M. Ennis: Commercial Banking 45
respect to the decreasing trend in unit banking is that before the complete
removal of branching regulations in the early nineties, unit banks were often
part of the same bank holding company and hence were managed as, essen-
tially, one bank. Furthermore, after 1989, the cross-guarantee provision in
FIRREA3 implied that solvent banks afﬁliated with a failing bank were li-
able for the losses associated with the failure (Walter 1996). In this sense,
the distinction between unit banking and banks with branches became less
meaningful, and a group of sister banks (that is, banks owned by the same
holding company) became not only managed as a single bank, but also legally
liable for each other’s losses. In summary, the move away from unit banking
presented in Panel D of Figure 1, if not interpreted with caution, can induce
us to overestimate the economic signiﬁcance of the change involved.
At the same time that the banking industry was under transformation, the
development of money markets and mutual funds created new possibilities
for ﬁrms to ﬁnance their investment and for investors to allocate their funds.
It is then a natural question to ask whether the role of banks has been losing
importance in the U.S. economy (see also Boyd and Gertler 1994). Panel A
of Figure 2 shows that banks’ total assets as a proportion of nominal gross
domestic product have been relatively stable since the beginning of the sev-
enties. If we interpret gross domestic product as a proxy for the size of the
economy, then we may say that commercial banks have roughly kept pace
with the secular growth in economic activity. Deposits, though, have become
less predominant, but the downward trend is very moderate.4
On the other hand, of the total liabilities outstanding in the economy,
commercial banks hold a smaller proportion now than they did in the early
seventies (see the bold line in Panel B of Figure 2). It is interesting to notice,
however, that the decreasing trend has been tapering off and that, as a conse-
quence, the proportion of total debt owed to banks is stabilizing at about 15
percent.5 A similar long-run trend appears when we consider ﬁnancial assets
held by banks as a proportion of the total liabilities owed by the domestic
nonﬁnancial sector (the thin line in Panel B of Figure 2). This ratio is harder
to interpret since some of the ﬁnancial assets held by banks are liabilities of
entities that belong to the ﬁnancial sector (and hence, they are included in the
numerator but not in the denominator). But some interesting facts arise from
its evaluation. First, we can see that in the last ten years bank assets have been
growingfasterthanthetotaldebtowedbythenonﬁnancialsector. Second, the
amount of debt owed by the ﬁnancial sector has been growing faster than the
3 FIRREA is the acronym for the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989.
4 The main reason why bank assets have been able to grow at about the same speed of GDP
while deposits have not, is that banks have increased their reliance on other borrowed funds to
ﬁnance their activities (see Figure 3).
5 Note that by combining the evidence in Panel A and B we can conclude that the total
amount of debt outstanding has been increasing faster than nominal GDP. In fact, the ratio of
total debt to GDP was 1.75 in 1984, and it is now higher than 3.0.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Note: The bold line in Panel B is the ratio of the total credit market assets held by
U.S.-chartered commercial banks to the total credit market debt held by all sectors in
the economy. The thin line (top) is the ratio of the total credit market assets held by
U.S.-chartered commercial banks to the total credit market debt held by the domestic
nonﬁnancial sector. Sources: In Panel A, nominal GDP is from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis; bank deposits are from the FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks Table CB15, and
bank loans and assets are from the FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks Table CB09. In
Panel B, all data are from Table L.1 of the Federal Reserve Board Release Z.1, Flow of
Funds Accounts.
amount of debt owed by the nonﬁnancial sector.6 In fact, this is true even if
6 This explains why in the last ten years the thick line in Panel B of Figure 2 has been
fairly ﬂat while the thin line has been increasing.H. M. Ennis: Commercial Banking 47
weexcludefromtheﬁnancialsectordebtthepartthatisowedbygovernment-
sponsored enterprises (GSE) and other federally related mortgage pools. In
other words, ﬁnancial sector debt has been growing faster, not just at GSEs (a
well-known fact), but across the board.
2. THE BALANCE SHEET
During the thirty years under consideration, together with the consolidation
trend in banking, the U.S. ﬁnancial system has experienced several other im-
portant changes that, directly or indirectly, inﬂuenced the evolution of com-
mercialbanks’balancesheets. Oneprominentexampleofthesedevelopments
is the increased participation of mutual funds in ﬁnancial markets. While the
amount of assets held by mutual funds represented less than 1 percent of to-
tal ﬁnancial assets in the economy at the beginning of the 1970s, they now
represent more than 11 percent. Since mutual funds are a direct alternative
to bank deposits as a channel for savings, their expansion has surely changed
the competitive conditions faced by banks in the deposit market. The plan for
this section is to review some of the major trends in the evolution of commer-
cial bank balance sheets in order to put in perspective the impact on banking
activities of the changes in ﬁnancial markets occurring in the last thirty years.
Commercial Banks Balance Sheet
Asset Side Liability Side
Cash Deposits
Loans and Leases Borrowed Funds
Securities Others
Others Equity Capital
Panel A of Figure 3 shows the long-run trends on the asset side of the
U.S. commercial banks’ aggregate balance sheet. The proportion of assets
represented by loans and leases has stabilized at 60 percent since the early
1980s.7 Holdings of securities ﬂuctuate around 20 percent, and cash holdings
have been trending downwards consistently, partly as a consequence of the
implementation of better techniques for cash management.
PanelBofFigure3presentsthecompositionoftotalgrossloans(excluding
interbank loans) at all commercial banks. We see that real estate loans have
been gaining ground while the proportion of commercial and industrial (C&I)
loanshavebeendecliningforalmosttwentyyears. Sinceloansarearelatively
stable proportion of total assets (see PanelA), the same trends also hold when
we look at each type of loan as a proportion of total assets.
7 During the three decades prior to 1980, the proportion of loans and leases increased from
40 percent to 60 percent while the proportion represented by securities decreased (see Boyd and
Gertler 1993).48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly






























































































































































































































































































































































































B. Compostion of Total Loans
































































































































































































































































































































































































D. Composition of Domestic Deposits
Demand Savings Time
Note: Borrowed funds represent federal funds purchased, securities sold under repur-
chase agreements, demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury, Federal Home Loan Bank
advances, mortgage indebtedness, liabilities under capitalized leases, and all other lia-
bilities for borrowed money. Subordinated notes and all other liabilities constitute a
very small (yet growing) portion of the liabilities and hence are not included the ﬁg-
ure. Source: The data in Panels A, C, and D are from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (Annual Data, Table CB09, CB14). The data in Panel B are from the Federal
Reserve Statistical Release (H8, End of Year Data).
Itisworthmentioningherethat,overthelasttwentyyears,oneofthemost
pronounced changes in the composition of bank loans across the industry is
the increasing share of real estate loans in the investment portfolio of small
banks (not in the ﬁgures). From a level of 22 percent of total assets in 1988,
real estate loans at small commercial banks steadily increased their share to a
level of more than 37 percent at the beginning of 2003.H. M. Ennis: Commercial Banking 49
Another interesting change in the composition of loans is the strong de-
crease in the C&I loans’ share of total loans during the last three years (see
Panel B of Figure 3). This decline is mostly explained by the corresponding
decline occurring at large banks (those banks with more than $300 million
in assets) where the proportion of C&I loans over total assets went from 19
percent in mid-2000 to around 12 percent in July 2003.
Figure2intheprevioussectionsuggestedthatbankinghasnotdeclinedin
importance relative to the aggregate economy, or at least not very much. One
relatedquestionwouldbetoaskwhetherbankinghaslostgroundasasourceof
funding for business undertakings. The decreasing contribution of C&I loans
to the loan portfolio of banks could be a symptom of such a trend. For a more
directassessmentofthisquestion,IconstructedFigure4. PanelAprovidesthe
evolution of bank loans to businesses (including not only C&I loans, but also
realestate-backedloanstobusinessesandothers)asaproportionoftotalbank
assets. We see that there has been a signiﬁcant drop in this proportion in the
lasttentoﬁfteenyears. Inprinciple,thisdecreasecouldbetheconsequenceof
a slowdown in business activities (relative to other activities in the economy).
However, Panel B shows that, during the same period, bank loans have also
beenlosinggroundasasourceoffundsforthenonﬁnancialcorporatebusiness
sector. In summary, bank loans to business are becoming less important both
for banks and for businesses.
Another important observation coming from Panel A of Figure 4 is that
in the last couple of years there has been a steep decrease of the proportion of
funds that banks loan to businesses. Even though real estate-backed loans to
business (as a proportion of total bank assets) have actually been increasing
during the last ﬁve years, this increase has not been large enough to offset
the pronounced decrease in the contribution of C&I loans in the last two or
three years (shown in Panel B of Figure 3). Panel B of Figure 4 shows that,
since 1999, bank loans have also been losing share in the total liabilities of
nonﬁnancial corporate businesses.
It is interesting to compare these recent developments with those taking
place at the beginning of the 1990s. The decline in bank loans to businesses
wasverystarkduringtheﬁrstthreeyearsofthelastdecade. Thisdeclinecould
be part of the motivation for the “credit-crunch concerns” that were expressed
at that time (see Green and Oh 1991). Considering that both 1991 and 2001
were recession years, it seems clear that loans to businesses have shown a
strong procyclicality in the last twenty years. This pattern is consistent with
theideaofalendingcycle. Yet,itshouldbeclariﬁedthatmoreevidencewould
be necessary to argue that such a lending cycle is a matter of concern.8
8 Weinberg (1995) clearly explains why, even in an efﬁcient credit market, the intensity of
loan activity in banks would ﬂuctuate with aggregate conditions. In this sense, to the extent that50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Loans to business are the result of aggregating all real estate-backed business loans,
all commercial and industrial loans, and all agricultural production loans. Source: Panel
A was constructed using FDIC quarterly data, and Panel B was constructed using data
from the Federal Reserve Board Release Z.1, Flow of Funds Accounts.
Going back to Figure 3, on the liability side of commercial banks balance
sheets, we see in Panel C that deposits have been losing ground to borrowed
funds as a source of funding for banks. The increased importance of mutual
fundsandofmoneymarketinstrumentsareanimportantpartoftheexplanation
forthistrend. Totheextentthatinvestmentinmutualfundshasbecomeaclose
substitute for deposits, banks are less able to rely on the latter to ﬁnance their
business investment has been especially weak during the 2001–2002 period, it should not come as
a surprise that bank loans to business have also shown relative weakness during this period.H. M. Ennis: Commercial Banking 51
lending activities. Also, banks are using more money market instruments to
manage their short-run liquidity needs, and such liabilities are included in the
“borrowed funds” category. Finally, in the last ten years, there has been an
increase in the amount of loans that commercial banks take from the Federal





in 1970 to less than 15 percent in 2003.9 Panel D also shows that in the last
ten years, savings accounts have been crowding out both time and demand
deposits.10
During the nineties, the share of total bank assets funded by core deposits
(total deposits less time deposits that are larger than $100,000) has been de-
creasingevenfasterthantheshareoftotaldeposits(seeGenay2000).11 Banks
have increased their reliance on more interest-sensitive liabilities for funding
their loan activities. In fact, the loan-to-deposit ratio is now above one (from
about 0.6 at the beginning of the seventies), implying that banks are loaning
out a higher amount of funds than they have in deposits.12 While borrowed
funds are more sensitive to interest rate changes, they also require lower re-
serve levels to satisfy unexpected swings in the demand for liquidity. The
lower need for reserves increases the propensity of banks to loan available
funds and hence increases the loan-to-deposit ratio.
One of the most important components of the liability side of banks’
balance sheets is, of course, equity capital. Table 1 shows some interesting
patterns in the holdings of equity capital by U.S. commercial banks.
First, smaller banks tend to hold higher capital ratios (deﬁned as equity
capitalovertotalassets). Thisevidenceisconsistentwiththeviewthatsmaller
bankstendtobelessdiversiﬁedandneedtoholdrelativelymoreequitycapital
9 Since the 1980s a type of transaction account called Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW)
has become more widely used. NOW accounts are not included in the demand deposit category
used in Panel D of Figure 4. It is interesting to note, however, that their increase in importance
has not been enough to compensate for the ground lost by demand deposits (another type of
transaction account). By dividing deposits into transaction and nontransaction accounts we can
observe that in the seventies, transaction accounts were around 50 percent of the total, but, since
then, they have been steadily losing participation to become less than 20 percent in 2002.
10 This increase in the importance of savings accounts versus demand deposits accounts is
partly associated with the increase in the use of “sweeping” since 1994. Sweep accounts allow
banks to periodically reclassify balances from retail transactions deposits into savings accounts so
as to reduce their reserve requirements (see Krainer 2001 for details).
11 This decreasing trend in core deposits has been reversed in the last couple of years, a
pattern consistent with the fact that this has been a period of low interest rates and especially
weak performance of the stock market (see Carlson and Perli 2002).
12 The loan-to-deposit ratio is calculated as the ratio of total gross loans and leases and total
domestic deposits in all FDIC insured commercial banks.52 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Equity Capital (Percent of TotalAssets)
Size <$100 Million $100 Million– $ 1 Billion– >$10 Billion
$ 1 Billion $10 Billion
1985 8.50 7.20 5.84 4.91
1990 8.98 7.67 6.33 5.26
1995 10.42 9.39 8.57 7.19
2000 11.06 9.59 8.98 8.07
2003* 11.27 9.94 10.61 8.52
Note: (*) The data for 2003 are only for the ﬁrst half of the year. Source: FDIC
Quarterly Banking Proﬁle.
to control the impact of agency costs in their access to external ﬁnancing (see,
for example, Ennis 2001).
Second, we can see that capital ratios have been increasing through time
for all bank sizes. During the eighties and nineties important changes in bank
regulation have increased the role of capital as a way of limiting the risk
exposure of banks. The Basel Accord in 1988 is, without a doubt, a clear
move toward increasing bank holdings of capital.13 In fact, the biggest jump
in capital ratios at commercial banks occurred during the ﬁrst four years of
the nineties when both the capital-to-asset ratio (in Table 1) and the risk-
adjusted capital ratio increased around 2 to 3 percent, on average. The risk-
adjusted capital ratio is calculated using a risk-adjusted asset base on which
each component of the bank’s assets is weighted according to a regulatory-
risk classiﬁcation. It should be said, however, that the risk classiﬁcation is
relatively coarse and hence the adjustment may fail to accurately reﬂect the
evolution of risk in banks’ portfolios. Still, to the extent that the adjustment
does take into account, at least partially, the changes in risk, it is interesting to
notethat,since1992,therisk-adjustedcapitalratiohasbeenrelativelyconstant
ataround12.5percent. Thisevidence,combinedwiththeinformationinTable
1, suggests that asset portfolios of banks have become riskier during the last
ten years.14
The risk-adjusted capital ratio started to be calculated ofﬁcially only after
1990,andhenceitisnotpossibletotakealong-runperspectiveonitsevolution.
The simpler captial-to-assets ratio presented in Table 1 allows us to obtain a
longer-run perspective on the evolution of capital (since 1985). Even though
13 The “prompt corrective action” clause introduced in the FDICIA uses Basel capital re-
quirements to determine when the regulators should intervene in the case of an undercapitalized
bank. As a consequence, the importance of capital ratios as a supervisory tool has increased since
1991.
14 The measure of risk-adjusted assets contains a component representing off-balance-sheet
exposure of banks, which has been gaining importance during the last decade.H. M. Ennis: Commercial Banking 53
this simpler ratio fails to account for changes in assets’ risk, it can still be
informative (as a complement to the risk-adjusted ratio) to the extent that
banks exercise regulatory-capital arbitrage to artiﬁcially reduce the measure
of adjusted assets. In support of this view, for example, Estrella, Park, and
Peristiani (2000) argue in favor of using simple capital ratios as informative
signals for predicting bank failures.
3. THE INCOME STATEMENT
I now turn to reviewing the long-run trends in the components of the income
statement of banks. Obviously, the changes in the structure of the industry
(see Section 1) and in the composition of the balance sheet (see Section 2)
can change the sources of income at banks. Another recent development
in banking that had signiﬁcant implications for the evolution of the income
statement is the increase in importance of off-balance-sheet activities. Some
of the most common off-balance-sheet activities are the provision of lines
of credit, the securitization and sale of loans, and the trading of derivative
instruments. Outstanding lines of credit, for example, are an important source
of fee income for banks. Some of these activities have become common
practice only relatively recently, and the data that would allow for the kind
of long-run perspective that I wish to provide in this article are not readily
available. Forthisreason,Iwillnotexplicitlycoverthisaspectoftheevolution
of banking in the recent past, but it should be kept in mind when interpreting
the trends in the income statement that I will discuss next.15
There are ﬁve main components of the income statement of commercial
banks: interest income and expense, non-interest income and expense, and
loan loss provisions. Interest income is the result of all interest and dividends
earned by banks on interest-bearing assets (such as loans and leases). Interest
expense is the result of all interest paid to depositors and other creditors of
the bank. Net interest income, then, is the difference between interest income
and interest expense. Non-interest income includes fee income, gains on se-
curities transactions, and all other income not originated in interest payments.
Non-interest expense includes personnel compensation, legal expenses, ofﬁce
occupancy and equipment expense, and other expenses. Finally, provision for
loan losses is the amount charged as operating expenses to provide an ade-
quate reserve to cover anticipated losses in the loan portfolio. These charges
become part of the allowance for loan losses, a negative component on the
asset side of the banks balance sheet, which is then used to charge off loans
after they become nonperforming.
15 For a thorough discussion of commercial banks’ off-balance-sheet activities, see Boyd and
Gertler (1993, 1994).54 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Income Statement
- Net Income
- Net Interest Income
- Interest Income
- Interest Expense (–)
- Provisions for Loan Losses (–)
- Non-interest Income
- Non-interest Expense (–)
Note: The negative sign in parenthesis (-) indicates that the component
is subtracted when computing net income.
In the last ten years, the annual return on assets (ROA) at commercial
banks in the United States has been historically high: the average since 1993
hasbeen1.15percent,whilefrom1950to1985theaveragewas0.72percent.16
There are several possible factors that could explain this sustained change in
level. One possibility is that there has been an increase in the efﬁciency with
which banks manage their assets. (This change constitutes a movement from
the interior of the set of feasible risk-return combinations toward the frontier
of that set.)17 A second possibility is that banks are engaging in riskier (on-
andoff-balance-sheet)activitiesthatareassociatedwithahigherrateofreturn.
(This change is a movement along the risk-return frontier of the feasible set.)
The evidence seems to indicate that the explanation for this increase in
return must be a combination of the two possible causes. On the one hand,
banksmaybemovingtowardincreasingefﬁciency. InFigure5wecanseethat
since the beginning of the nineties, coinciding with the increase in ROA, the
ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets has been decreasing steadily. The
decrease of total operational expenses relative to assets could be indicative of
an improvement in the efﬁciency level with which banks handle their assets.
Another way of thinking about aggregate movements toward the risk-return
frontier is to think that an increasing number of institutions are getting closer
to implementing the current best managerial practices for banks. Berger and
Mester (2003) provide some evidence that seems to indicate that the average
inability of banks to adopt best practices has decreased during the 1990s (see
their Table 3). On this same line of inquiry, Berger and Humphrey (1992)
undertake a detailed analysis of the 1980s, a period of rising inefﬁciency due
to dispersion inside the best-practice frontier.
On the other hand, banks may be taking more risks. As we saw in the
previoussection,therisk-adjustedassetsbaseusedforregulatorypurposeshas
16Annual return on assets is deﬁned as the ratio of annual net income and total average
assets. Since the banking industry experienced a generalized crisis from 1986 to 1992, those years
were left out for the sake of long-run trend comparison.
17 Inefﬁciency in banking may originate not only in banks having higher resource cost than
necessary, but also in the fact that some banks may be holding a portfolio of assets that, conditional
upon risk, is dominated in rate of return by other feasible portfolios.H. M. Ennis: Commercial Banking 55






Source: Annual data from the FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks Table CB04.
been growing at a higher rate than unadjusted bank assets during the nineties.
This fact implies that under the (imperfect) regulatory risk classiﬁcation of
assets, banks are indeed taking on more risk. Another piece of evidence that
supports this view is given in Figure 6, which shows both the evolution of
return on assets and charge-offs at commercial banks since 1970. We can see
in the ﬁgure that, together with the increase in return on assets since 1993, the
levelofcharge-offsasaproportionofloansremainedrelativelyhighcompared
with its historic level of around 0.3 percent. If we think that the charge-offs
to loans ratio is positively correlated with the risk of the loan portfolio, then
we can conclude that since 1993 both risk and return have increased in the
banking industry.18
Athirdpossibleexplanationfortheincreaseinthereturnonbanks’activi-
ties is based on the notion that the 1990s was a period of repeated innovations
in banking (such as credit scoring, widespreadATM networks, and many oth-
ers). Early adopters of new technologies tend to earn supernormal proﬁts for
18 Berger and Mester (2003) use the average standard deviation of annual return on assets
as a proxy for bank risk. They show that this indicator has actually been decreasing during the
nineties, but, due to lack of data, they do not present estimates for the seventies and early eighties.56 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 6 The Risk-Return Frontier
Return on Assets and Charge-offs
Net Income to Assets
Change-offs to Loans
Source: Annual data from the FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks Table CB04 and Table
CB08.
some time until the technology becomes widely used by competitors. Re-
peated innovations can then explain a long period of high returns like the
one the banking industry experienced during the 1990s. Berger and Mester
(2003) suggest this possibility but do not provide direct evidence supporting
the hypothesis.
Ingeneral,theevolutionofthereturnonassetshasbeenrelativelyuniform
across bank sizes. In particular, ROA decreased for all bank sizes during the
secondhalfoftheeightiesandthebeginningoftheninetiesandthenrecovered
to levels of above 1 percent after 1993. The exception to this uniformity of
behavioracrosssizesisthelargevariationinROAduring1987–88(seeFigure
5). These variations at the industry level mostly reﬂect the changes in ROA at
banks with more than $10 billion in assets (the largest category).19
With respect to the evolution of charge-offs across bank sizes, the story is
somewhat different. While small banks (those with less than $100 million in
19 In 1987, provision for loan losses at large banks spiked up signiﬁcantly (creating the oppo-
site effect on ROA). This increase in provisions is mostly explained by the need to write off large
international loans to less developed countries that became nonperforming after the international
debt crisis of the eighties.H. M. Ennis: Commercial Banking 57
Figure 7 Interest Income at Commercial Banks
Net Interest Margin (by Bank Asset Size)
Note: The net interest margin is the ratio of net interest income and interest earning
assets. The data are for four different sizes of banks: banks with more that $10 billion
in assets, banks with $1 billion to $10 billion in assets, banks with $100 million to
$1 billion in assets, and banks with less than $100 million in assets. Source: FDIC
Quarterly Banking Proﬁle. The data for 2003 are only for the ﬁrst half of the year.
assets) had relatively high levels of charge-offs during the mid-eighties, the
spike in the late eighties and early nineties (see Figure 6) is fully explained by
theincreaseincharge-offsatmedium-to-largebanks(thosewithmorethan$1
billion in assets). Similarly, the increase in charge-offs during 2001 is mostly
concentrated in these medium-to-large size banks. Overall, charge-offs tend
to be fairly procyclical, but, again, the behavior across different sizes of banks
is not very uniform. In particular, during the 2001 recession, the level of the
charge-off ratio at banks with less than $1 billion in assets does not show any
signiﬁcant increase.
The net interest margin is one of the most common indicators of prof-
itabilityintraditionalbankingactivities(thatis,holdingdepositsandlending).
This indicator results from expressing net interest income as a percentage of
(average) interest-earning assets. Figure 7 shows that medium-to-large banks
experience a signiﬁcant increase in the net interest margin at the beginning of
the nineties. On average, net interest margins have been higher at all banks58 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly







































































































































































































































































































































































B. Composition of Non-interest Expense
Salaries Occupancy       Other
Note: Fee income represents the amount of all service charges on deposit accounts in
domestic ofﬁces such as maintenance fees, activity charges, administrative charges, over-
draft charges, and check certiﬁcation charges. Other non-interest income includes: income
from ﬁduciary activities; gains, losses, and fees relating to foreign currency or foreign
exchange transactions; gains, losses, and fees from assets held in trading accounts; net
gains from the sale or disposition of loans, premises (including branches and ofﬁces)
and ﬁxed assets, and other real estate owned; all service charges, fees, and commissions
(other than those relating to deposits in domestic ofﬁces); fees charged on bank-issued
credit cards; net gains on futures and forward contracts; and other miscellaneous income.
Source: Annual data from the FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks Table CB07.
during the nineties. These higher margins are consistent with an increase in
default and interest-rate risk at banks.20 Angbazo (1997) provides further evi-
dence on this link between interest margins and risks at banks. He also shows
that off-balance-sheet activities tend to increase risk and interest rate margins
at banks.
Figure 8 shows the trends in the composition of non-interest income and
expenses. While non-interest income has increased substantially during the
last twenty years (see Figure 5), its composition has not changed much (see
Panel A of Figure 8). In particular, income from fees on deposit accounts
has been stable at around 20 percent of total non-interest income for a long
time. In summary, it is true that in the last twenty years fee income has
been increasing relative to total gross income at banks, but other non-interest
20 Interest rate risk is the exposure of a bank’s ﬁnancial condition to adverse movements in
interest rates (see Basle Committee 1997).H. M. Ennis: Commercial Banking 59
income has also become increasingly important.21 Boyd and Gertler (1994)
suggest that the evolution of the relative contribution of other non-interest
income to total income is a good proxy for the increase in importance of off-
balance-sheet activities at banks. In this respect, after growing steadily for the
last twenty years, other non-interest income has gone from representing less
than 10 percent of bank income in the seventies to representing more than 25
percent of such income today.
With respect to non-interest expense, there is a clear trend toward a lower
contribution of salaries and employee beneﬁts to total non-interest expenses.
This decrease is almost exactly matched by the increase in the proportion of
other expenses, while the contribution of occupancy expenses remains con-
stant. In the last couple of decades there has been a tendency for banks to out-
source employment-intensive activities to other afﬁliates of the bank holding
company or to service bureaus (Berger and Mester 2003). The cost of these
outsourced activities becomes part of the “other” component of non-interest
expenseatthesametimethatitreducesthe“salaries”portionoftotalexpense.
4. CONCLUSION
The banking trends reviewed in this article suggest some conclusions. First,
even though commercial banking activities have been changing signiﬁcantly,
banks as a group are still a very important player in the ﬁnancial markets of
the U.S. economy. Second, banks do seem to be moving away from their
traditional activities of handling deposits and providing loans to business, but
this trend is fairly gradual. Third, while banking activities have become more
proﬁtable in general, the evidence suggests that they have also become riskier.
Finally, as I suggested in the introduction, taking a long-run perspective
can help to identify some patterns of the response of modern banking to eco-
nomic slowdowns. Although a careful study of this issue was beyond the
scope of this article (see Schuermann 2004), from the comparison of the data
from 1990–91 and 2001, some regularities can be identiﬁed. For example,
bank loans to businesses seem to be very procyclical, and both charge-offs
and net interest margins seem to be relatively countercyclical.
21 For a detailed study of the evolution of banks’ retail fees during the nineties, see Hannan
(2001).60 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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